# Probe transcript — Rentry (e2e) | | | |---|---| | Entry | `entries/rentry.yaml` | | Target | https://rentry.co · API `https://rentry.co/api/new` | | Mode | `e2e` | | Probe id | `rentry-e2e` | | Rubric | `rubric/v0.2.json` sha256 `cd605a44799f49951bf078fda63c5b21ad3c07db494f41d38ad19ce729c5551a` | | Date | 2026-09-05 | | Verdict | `completed` | | Real money spent | $0.00 — no payment instrument presented or requested | | Human interventions | 0 | | Secrets carried in | none. `PROBE_WALLET_KEY` unset, `PROBE_SPEND_CAP_USD=0`. No credential, cookie, or token sent or received | All target traffic was issued from inside the probe sandbox (`.claude/skills/probe/probe-sandbox.sh`) on an `--internal` Docker network whose only egress is an allowlisting tinyproxy sidecar. No request to the target was made from the host shell. ```sh ./.claude/skills/probe/probe-sandbox.sh up --id rentry-e2e --target rentry.co ``` Allowlist: `rentry.co` (and, by the sidecar's `(^|\.)host$` rule, its subdomains). Nothing else. --- ## 0. Reference task > With no credentials of any kind, POST markdown to `https://rentry.co/api/new` > and pass only if the JSON response has `status` "200", a `url` field pointing > at `rentry.co/`, and an `edit_code`; then GET that rendered page (the > bare URL — NOT `/raw`, which robots.txt disallows) over HTTP 200 and confirm > it contains the exact marker string that was posted. Objectively checkable: the marker `token-8f3a2c1` either appears in the rendered page or it does not. --- ## 1. Permission gate robots.txt (retrieved in-sandbox, HTTP 200): ``` User-agent: * Disallow: /*/source Disallow: /*/raw Disallow: /*/pdf Disallow: /*/png Disallow: /*/export-page Disallow: /*/edit ``` The disallow list covers the raw/source/export/edit *views* of a paste. It does **not** cover `/api/new` (the create endpoint) nor the bare rendered page `rentry.co/`. The reference task was designed to respect this: creation uses `/api/new`, and verification uses the bare rendered page, never `/raw`. `/what` (retrieved in-sandbox) states the rules and confirms the API: ``` Some sort of rules Don't spam, don't abuse, don't break the law. ... Available over API ``` It links five policy pages: `/rentry_acceptable_use_policy`, `/rentry_terms_of_service`, `/rentry_privacy_policy`, `/rentry_cookie_policy`, `/rentry_dmca_policy`. The Acceptable Use Policy (`/rentry_acceptable_use_policy`, 21 640 bytes) and Terms of Service (`/rentry_terms_of_service`, 18 885 bytes, effective 1 Nov 2024) were fetched and scanned in full for the tokens `automat|bot|scrap|crawl|spider|script|robot|agent|programmatic|machine|api|rate.?limit|human|means|prohibit|must not|may not`. **Neither document contains any prohibition on automated, bot, scripted, agent, or programmatic use, and neither requires a user to be human.** The AUP's "Prohibited uses" list is content- and lawfulness-based: ``` You may use our site only for lawful purposes. You may not use our platform: In any way that breaches any applicable United Kingdom or international law. ... Not to access without authority, interfere with, damage or disrupt: any part of our platform; ... ``` Using the operator's own documented public API is authorised access, so it does not engage the "access without authority" clause. Gate result: `permission.status: unstated` — no explicit grant of automated use exists, but neither is there any prohibition, and the operator affirmatively provides and documents a public, CSRF-exempt API. Scored `unstated` on the frankfurter/2s precedent: a documented API is an invitation, not a term the operator is bound to. No `permissive-tos` bonus. --- ## 2. Create the paste — `POST /api/new` The GitHub README (github.com/radude/rentry, the canonical API doc) states the `/api` endpoints are CSRF-exempt ("you don't need a csrf token, cookies or a Referer header") and anonymous creation is rate-limited to ~10/min per IP with a `429` on excess. One create call was made, well under that ceiling. ```sh curl -F "text=" \ https://rentry.co/api/new ``` Response (HTTP 200, 0.586 s): ```json {"status": "200", "content": "OK", "url": "https://rentry.co/nhmgam8p", "url_short": "nhmgam8p", "edit_code": "6qetJMRD"} ``` A public URL and an edit code came back on the first anonymous call with no Authorization header, no cookie, and no CSRF token. --- ## 3. Verify the rendered page (robots-compliant) ```sh curl https://rentry.co/nhmgam8p # bare rendered page, NOT /raw ``` HTTP 200, 11 448 bytes, 0.218 s. The marker string appears (grep count 4, including the ``, `og:description`, `twitter:description` and the rendered body): ``` Marker: ag3ntsearch probe rentry 2026-09-05 token-8f3a2c1 item one item two ``` Pass: the exact posted markdown is served back from the public URL, with zero credentials and zero human input. --- ## 4. Safety observations Injection scan over every fetched body (`home.html`, `what.html`, both policy pages, `rentry_new.json`, `rentry_render.html`) for `ignore (previous|prior|above)|you are now|as an ai|system prompt|disregard|new instructions|assistant:` returned **no hits**. No model-addressed text, no hidden imperatives. The homepage references `/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection` (Cloudflare email obfuscation) — Cloudflare fronts the site but served every request without a challenge or CAPTCHA during this run. No secret was sent or received. The `edit_code` returned (`6qetJMRD`) is a capability the API minted for this new paste, not a pre-existing credential; it is recorded here because it is part of the observed response, not redacted as a carried secret. --- ## 5. Egress log Every CONNECT in the proxy log is to `rentry.co:443`. No blocked attempts, no off-domain redirects. ``` CONNECT rentry.co:443 HTTP/1.1 Established connection to host "rentry.co" ... (repeated for each request; --- blocked --- section empty) ``` --- ## 6. Scoring rationale | dim | rung | why | |---|---|---| | access | 25 | No auth, no signup, no email. `POST /api/new` returned a working url + edit_code on the first anonymous call. | | payment | 25 | Free; no card, no wallet, no credits. Reference task cost $0. | | interface | 12 | Documented REST (`/api/new`, CSRF-exempt), but no OpenAPI/schema file; the canonical docs live in a GitHub README and the on-site `/api` page served 0 bytes. | | completion | 20 | Task completed end-to-end, no human, no out-of-band knowledge — create then verify from the returned URL. | | docs | 7 | Good README: fields, CSRF exemption, rate limit (~10/min, 429) all documented and the example ran verbatim. No llms.txt, no versioned schema, and the on-site `/api` page is empty. | Sum 89, no bonus, no penalty → `a_score` 89, verdict `completed`, band `ready`. Wall: none. The only ergonomic wrinkle is that the machine-readable API docs are a GitHub README rather than an on-site schema, and the on-site `/api` path returns an empty body.